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KENTUCKY LAW Jou.NAV
IN DEFENSE OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
INTRODUCTION
In many debates concerning capital punishment, the crimes for
which it is given are entirely overlooked and the plight of the one
convicted is generally stressed. This is unfortunate since a true
evaluation of capital punishment cannot be made unless it is con-
sidered in the light of the crimes for which it has been given as the
penalty. In the following three cases the defendant received the
death penalty:
1. The defendant had raped and murdered his victim and after-
wards attempted to have intercourse with her body.
2. The defendant unnaturally assaulted two young boys and
then abandoned them in a bay.
3. The defendant raped the mother, killed her husband and one
small child and left two other children for dead.'
These are illustrative of the type of crimes for which the death
penalty is given-crimes which shock the public and offend all sense
of morality. Generally speaking, a capital crime must be of this
nature for the death penalty to be given, as is evidenced by the fact
that a defendant accused of a capital crime'has merely one chance
in a hundred of being given the death penalty.2 This fact prompted
a British writer to compare an execution in the United States to
"an act of God."3
No one will question the proposition that laws should only be
changed when society as' a whole will benefit from such change.
A necessary corollary to this proposition is that the status quo should,
and rightfully so, assume the defensive. The burden of proving that
a change is warranted should fall on the shoulders of those who
would advocate the change. Nowhere in the law has the foregoing
proposition been proven more conclusively than in the area of capital
punishment. The proponents of the abolition of capital punishment
have produced a vast amount of literature in support of their recom-
mended change, while its defenders have remained relatively silent.
For this reason it may seem to the casual reader in this field that the
arguments in favor of the abolition of capital punishment are given
more authoritative support than the opposing arguments, but it must
1 Gerstein, A Prosecutor Looks at Capital Punishment, 51 J. Crim. L., C. &
P.S. 252, 254 (1961).
2A.B.A. Proceedings, Section of Criminal Law 6 (1959).
3 Duff, A New Handbook on Hanging 50 (1954).
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be remembered that far more material is available to support the
side of the opponents. 4
The abolitionists put forth many arguments in support of their
position, but there are only thirteen which appear repeatedly and
are therefore deemed by the author to be basic premises. Of these,
five are basically sound and require a careful analysis; the remaining
eight are considered by the author to be basically unsound and
therefore very easily rebutted. As the title implies, the scope of this




Advocates of the abolition of capital punishment usually present
as their first argument the proposition that, "the evidence clearly
shows that execution does not act as a deterrent to capital crimes."5
First, they argue that the death penalty, in some isolated instances,
actually encourages capital crimes. As a basis for this contention, it
is said that psychologists suggest that the death wish is a factor in
the human mind as equally dominant as the instinct for self-preser-
vation.6 However, Dr. Melitta Schmideberg has recently made the
following statement in rebuttal:
The assumption that offenders break the law because of an unconscious
wish for punishment seems to me unsubstantiated and too general an
explanation. It would, however, even if correct, be no argument to
abolish punishment or even to avoid it in the individual offender.
Punishment may or may not deter. If there is efficient law enforcement
and a belief in justice, mostly it does.8
Also, it would seem to be impossible for those who advocate aboli-
tion to argue that the instinct for self-preservation is not a very real
factor in the minds of many potential felons. Cases can be produced
where a robber carried no weapon so that he would not be tempted to
4 Koestler, Reflections on Hanging 165 (1957).
G Bennett, A Historic Move: Delaware Abolishes Capital Punishment, 44
A.B.A.J. 1053 (1958).6 Weihofen, The Urge to Punish 154 (1956).
7 Dr. Schmideberg is Director of Clinical *Services for the Association for
the Psychiatric Treatment of Offenders (APTO), New York, and Medical Ad-
visor for the Board of Corrections of New York City. Dr. Schmideberg is also
co-editor of the APTO Journal, a member of the International- Board of Editors
of Excerpta Criminologiea, and Associate Editor of Archives of Criminal Psycho-
Dynamics.
8 Schmidelberg, The Offenders Attitude Toward Punishment, 51 J. Crim.
L., C. & P.S. 328, 334 (1961).
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use it in making his escape; where a criminal has submitted to arrest
rather than resist with a weapon; or where a criminal has moved
to an abolition state in order to carry out a capital crime.9 In all
three cases the offenders admitted that it was fear of the death penalty
which caused their actions. To say that there are at least as many
cases of this nature as there are cases in which the offender's motive
in killing was the "death wish" would almost certainly be an under-
statement.
Secondly, they argue that when the crime committed is a capital
offense other than killing, such as rape or kidnapping, the threat of
death may actually encourage murder.'0 The theory is that after a
man has committed a crime of this nature he is more likely to cover
his trail by murdering his victim, since, if caught, he is already subject
to the death penalty.
Although this theory undoubtedly has some merit, it is more than
merely offset by the converse proposition. If capital punishment
were abolished, a criminal caught in the act of committing any crime
punishable by a life sentence would not hesitate to kill in order to
escape since he has already subjected himself to life imprisonment,
which would also be the penalty for murder.
Thirdly, it is argued that statistics which compare capital punish-
deter." The statistics show that the states which retain the penalty
have no lower incidence of capital crimes and, in fact, the incidence
is sometimes higher.
However, it should be emphasized that criminologists and sociologists
agree that statistics are an unsatisfactory indication of the deterrent
effect of the death penalty because murder is a complex sociological
problem, as well as a crime, and contributing factors such as race,
heredity, regional lines, standards of housing and education, are in-
tangibles, the value of which is difficult to assess.12
Moreover, an exhaustive study of the problem was made in Eng-
land by the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment and it con-
cluded that although capital punishment has some deterrent effect
"and that no punishment at all would not be feasible, the relation
between the homicide rate and the death penalty cannot be dis-
cerned.'3 This admission by one of the strong proponents for the
abolition of capital punishment that it has some deterrent effect
would indicate the weakness of the statistical argument. It should
9 Gerstein, supra note 1, at 252.1o Wechsler, Big Debate on Capital Punishment, Life, May 19, 1960, p. 42.
11 Reichert, Capital Punishment Reconsidered, 47 Ky. LJ. 897, 400 (1958).
'
2 Gerstein, supra note 1, at 252.
Is Royal Commission on Capital Punishment Report 24 (1953).
[Vol. 54
also be noted that the statistics "for the most part have been as-
sembled by those who would abolish the death penalty; their object
has been to disprove the deterrent value claimed for that punish-
ment. 14
Furthermore, the statistics cannot tell us how many potential
criminals the death penalty has deterred from the commission of
a capital offense. Judge Hyman Barshay of New York gave an ex-
cellent illustration of this when he stated:
The death penalty is a warning, just like a lighthouse throwing its
beams out to sea. We hear about the shipwrecks but we do not hear
about the ships the lighthouse guides safely on their way. We do not
have proof of the number of ships it saves, but we do not tear the
lighthouse down.15
It might be said that, as far as the statistics go, there is a "lack of
evidence that it [capital punishment] is more of a deterrent than any
other forms of punishment," 6 but there is a greater lack of evidence
that it is not.
Conviction of the Innocent
The second argument is the proposition that "convictions of the
innocent do occur and death makes a miscarriage of justice irre-
vocable. Human judgment cannot be infallible." 17 This contention
is based upon a fear that three unrelated factors may have a pro-
found and disastrous effect on the outcome of any given trial. First,
abolitionists stress the fallibility of a single jury and overlook the
fact that it is made up of twelve reasonable men who understand
fully the magnitude of their responsibilities. Secondly, they assert the
possibility of an inflamed atmosphere in which the trial might take
place, but fail to mention the fact that venue provisions allow for a
removal of a trial to a new jurisdiction if an "inflamed atmosphere"
would render a fair trial impossible at the place where the action
was originally brought. Thirdly, they indicate that the disposition
of a single judge may have a great effect on the outcome of the case,
but forget that a judge, although unquestionably plagued by human
emotions, will make a real and determined effort on the bench to be
completely objective and unswayed by social, economic or political
pressures. Furthermore, assuming that an innocent man is convicted
at the trial level, an appeal may be taken and in the calm, impartial
14 Id. at 22.
l0 Barshay, Capital Punishment: Pro and Con, 71 Senior Scholastic 6 (Sept.
20, 1957).16 Weihofen, supra note 6.
1 7 Bennett, supra note 5.
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atmosphere surrounding an appellate court he may have the con-
viction set aside and a judgment of acquittal entered. Also, the ap-
pellate court may grant a new trial, or reduce the capital charge to
a lesser offense if the jury could have so found on the evidence.
The jurors, the attorneys and the judges do not take their roles lightly
in a trial involving a capital offense, and therefore no man whose
life is at stake is given a superficial trial. Bearing this in mind,
there is little chance of an innocent man being sentenced to death.
As Judge Learned Hand once said, "Our procedure has always been
haunted by the ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal
dream."'
Two leading writers on conviction of the innocent 9 cite forty
and sixty cases, respectively, but not all were capital cases. Consider-
ing all the cases which have been decided, these represent a minute
percentage. All things considered, "the possibilities that the wrong
man may be executed.., is not of overriding importance:
20
Another factor to consider is that if a convicted murderer should
not be convicted because of the fallibility of human nature, then that
same fallibility will be ever present and may afford an opportunity
for his escape leaving more victims in his wake.
Convictions of the Mentally Disturbed and Impulsive Criminals
The third major argument involves the proposition that "serious
offenses are committed, except in rare instances by those suffering
from mental disturbances; are impulsive in nature, and are not acts
of the criminal class."2 This premise consists of three distinct allega-
tions which will be considered in the order in which they are set
forth in the argument.
First, the argument that "serious offenses are committed, except
in rare instances, by those suffering from mental disturbances" will
be considered. The only reference found illustrative of what is
meant by "mental disturbances" as used by the proponents of this
theory, was found in an argument in support thereof, as follows:
"The committee stated that about one murder out of seven is com-
mitted by a person who is so deteriorated mentally as to have no con-
ception of the consequences." [Emphasis added.]22 A person who is
so deteriorated mentally as to have no conception of the conse-
18 Mayers, Shall We Amend the Fifth Amendment? 37 (1959).
19 Borchard, Convicting the Innocent (1932); Frank, Not Guilty (1957).2 0 Davitt, The Elements of Law 221 (1959).
21 Bennett, supra note 5.




quences would clearly be legally insane under either of the best
known and most widely accepted definitions of criminal insanity.
23
A person who had no conception of the consequences of his act
would not know right from vrong,24 or the jury could easily find
that the "actions were the product of a mental disease or defect."25
Therefore, this argument is an attack upon the efficiency of our
judicial system in rendering justice, not a valid argument against
capital punishment. This is true because every state in the union
and virtually all civilized nations of the world provide that insanity
is a complete defense to an offense punishable by death. If an ac-
cused is so mentally defective as to be determined legally insane he
will be incarcerated in a mental institution or the penitentiary and
wll not be given the death penalty. The required mental defec-
tiveness, of course, is a question of degree to be determined by the
court and a jury of his peers.
Secondly, we will consider the proposition that many serious
offenses are impulsive in nature. That is true, but that the law has,
in certain circumstances, recognized this, is illustrated by the fact that
killings done in "heat of passion" and in "sudden affray" will not be
considered as first degree?6 These are mitigating circumstances, and
rightly so, but are all impulsive killings something less than murder?
Killings in street brawls and over poker tables may very well be
impulsive, but they are nonetheless murder. In a civilized society,
men so dangerous that they kill when they lose their tempers should
be executed for the safety of other people. It should be noted at
this point that when reference is made in this article to "other people"
(as above) or to "society" the terms include prison personnel and
inmates who would be in daily contact with the "impulsive" or
"mentally disturbed" inmate who is given a life sentence. Will this
person, convicted of a capital crime, be any less impulsive or men-
tally disturbed behind the prison walls? Will his associates therein
be able to avoid any conflict with him? The answer is negative. 7
A prison guard or inmate is not any less a part of society or any
less entitled to the protection it affords because of his position than
the public in general.
2 3M'Naghten Case, 10 C. and F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep., 718 (1843); Durham
v. United States, 94 App. D.C. 228, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).2 4 M'Naghten Rule: If the defendant did not know the nature of his act
or that it was wrong, he will be declared insane.25 Durham Rule: One accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful
act was the product of a mental disease or defect.26 Cottell v. Commonwealth, 271 Ky. 52, 111 S.W.2d 445 (1937); Beach
v. Commonwealth, 240 Ky. 763, 43 S.W.2d 6 (1931).2 7 Sellin, Capital Punishment, 25 Fed. Prob. 7 (1961).
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The third portion of this argument alleges that "capital crimes,
except in rare instances ... are not acts of the criminal class." The
abolitionists inculde in the category of persons outside of the "crim-
inal class" those who are pathological personalities, those who act
in a fit of passion and those whose act is premeditated but caused by
"the culmination of embitterment and frustration in the generation
of which the victim played a part. 28 They argue that these are good
citizens who have unfortunately done one bad thing and that they
should not be considered in the same light as hardened criminals,
especially racketeers, who are the real threats to society. Is the
victim of one who kills in a fit of passion any less dead than the
victim of a 'hardened criminal"? It is the author's contention that a
second similar crime will be easier for each type. The abolitionists
are emphatic in their denunciation of the death penalty for those
outside the criminal class, but they imply that capital punishment
for the professionals (hardened criminals) would be or at least might
be a good thing.9 It may be concluded from this that their attack
is not upon the penalty as such, but upon its general application to
both impulsive and professional criminals.
Unequal Application of the Law
The fourth argument put forth is that "unequal application of
the law takes place because those executed are the poor, the ignorant,
and the unfortunate without resources.8 0 This is another argument
that is concerned with the integrity of our judicial system and not
the punishment it renders. This is clarified by the fact that nowhere
in the vast amount of material produced which expounds upon this
argument is there any allegation that the "poor," "ignorant," and
"unfortunate" were not guilty as charged, but only that others
(wealthy and influential) who were charged with similar crimes
were given a sentence less than death. Their argument seems to be
that if our judicial system is incapable of rendering uniform pun-
ishment then the death sentence should be abolished. It seems to the
writer that although this is a weak argument against capital punish-
ment (those executed were unquestionably guilty), it is a strong
indictment against not only our judiciary, but the public as a whole
for acquiescing in its continued existence. However, in recent years
steps have been taken to remedy this condition. The "poor" and the
28 Snyder, Capital Punishment: The Moral Issue, 63 W. Va. L. Rev. 99,
115 (1961).
9 
obit.3o Bennett, supra n te 5.
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"unfortunate" without resources are appointed counsel by the court, 31
which counsel invariably do very commendable jobs in their de-
fenses. Although the appointed counsel is not at present adequately
reimbursed for his efforts, his belief in justice and knowledge that
reputations are enhanced by participating in this type of case,
prompt him to more than merely adequately represent the accused
for which he is appointed. The "ignorant" are now notified before
questioning of their right to counsel and of the fact that they are not
required to answer until counsel is present.32 This right to appointed
counsel at all stages of the case would seem to absolve both the
judiciary and the public of the charge that only the "poor," "ignor-
ant" and "unfortunate" are executed. These people are now en-
titled to and get the same protection before, during and after the
trial that is available to the more fortunate accused. When adequately
represented, the poor and the wealthy stand on equal footing in the
eyes of the jury.
Life Sentence Alternative
The proponents of abolition contend that "society is amply pro-
tected by a sentence of life imprisonment."33 In order for the aboli-
tionists to sustain this proposition, they must show that prison guards
and inmates are not a part of the society which they allege is amply
protected. As was stated earlier in this article, it is the author's firm
belief that prison personnel and inmates cannot be excluded from
the term "society" simply because they are confined within prison
walls. Surely the proponents do not contemplate solitary confine-
ment in their definition of life imprisonment since this would almost
universally be considered a fate worse than death. It will be as-
sumed that the proponents of abolition concede that prison personnel
and inmates are a definite part of society, since a contrary assertaion
by them would appear to be untenable. Since the prison personnel
and inmates will be in daily contact with the person convicted of a
serious crime and given the maximum penalty, a life sentence, how
can the abolitionists contend that this portion of society is amply
protected? As long as there exists the possibility of a cold blooded
killing within the walls and the possibility of escape (due to the
fallibility of human nature), there would seem to exist a very real
danger to society. It is impossible to argue the fact that, given the
opportunity, a convict serving a life sentence will attempt to escape,
31 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
32 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
33 Bennett, supra note 5.
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and, if capital punishment be abolished, he will unhesitatingly kill
anyone, whether guard or innocent bystander, whom he believes
may stand in his path. Who would contend that this is not true?
Should the convict make good his escape then society as a whole
is again confronted with this menace, and, having been exposed to
the true nature of his sentence, it is at least doubtful that he would
allow himself to be taken again without bloodshed.
The author admits that killings within prison walls and escapes
therefrom are infrequent, but they do occur. Therefore, the life
sentence alternative is not perfect security against the commission
of other crimes.3 4 If one innocent life is lost society is not amply
protected.
ARGUMENTS BASICALLY UNSOUND
State Sets a Bad Example
The proponents of abolition argue that "the state sets a bad
example when it takes a life. Imitative crimes and murder are stim-
ulated by execution."35 In defense of the first contention, "Governor
Disalle, in his special message, said that one of the obligations of
society is to establish a civilization that takes into consideration the
example that people must set."36 This is true, but an even more im-
portant and fundamental obligation of society is to protect its
members and to punish and restrain offenders. Capital punishment
is not murder, as the opponents of capital punishment would have us
believe, but society's method of self-protection. The fear of execu-
tion is society's major psychological weapon in its attempt to min-
imize capital crime. "Enlightened and civilized countries ever since
the Greeks have tried to develop a social or religious ideology that
supplants the fear of law, but it would be unrealistic to assume that
ideals could ever supplant it."3 The argument illustrated by Governor
Disalle's statement is based on ideology and is undoubtedly true but
there are two reasons why it is untenable. First, our society has not
reached that stage of civilization which can maintain justice and
order without the fear of punishment. Secondly, if capital punish-
ment is considered in its true light, that is as a means of self-protec-
tion of society, the state does not set a bad example when it is forced
to carry out its duty. The self-protection concept will be considered
84 Gerstein, supra note 1, at 255.35 Bennett, supra note 5.
36 Goetz, supra note 22, at 378.
3 Sehxnideberg, supra note 8, at 829.
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in greater detail later in this article under the heading of "legal
murder."
Abolitionists also urge that imitative crimes and murder are
stimulated by execution, but the author has found nothing to sub-
stantiate this contention, Assuming, but by no means conceding,
that this has been one of the motivating factors in the minds of a
few criminals, it would be improbable that the abolitionists would
contend that this thought was the sole or driving force which
motivated them. On the other hand, what effect would the aboli-
tion of capital punishment have upon the philosophy of our potential
criminals? Richard M. Gerstein stated his answer to this question
as follows:
Many of them might very well look upon the criminal code, inculding
that part of it forbidding murder, as a mere convention of society which
advanced thinking and progressive social theories permit them to set
aside as a matter of no consequence. This theory leads .to the belief
that each is a law unto himself; that each may choose the laws which
he will obey, and that he may violate the rest. This type of thinking
would eventually lead us into virtual anarchy.38
This argument seems to the writer to be basically more sound than
the contention put forth by the advocates of abolition.
Execution is Useless and Demoralizing
Next, the abolitionists argue that "legally taking a life is useless
and demoralizing to the general public."39 The proponents of this
argument inevitably base it upon a vivid description of the gruesome
scene in the death chamber, the nauseating atmosphere and the ex-
pression on the dying man's face; they tend to forget the victim of
his act, the suffering of his family and widespread fear created in the
community. Was his execution more demoralizing to the general
public than was his crime?
The following excerpt from the report of the Royal Commission
on Capital Punishment indicates a very different viewpoint of the
general public:
Moreover, we think it must be recognized that there is a strong and
widespread demand for retribution in the sense of reprobation-not
always unmixed in the proper mind with that of atonement and expia-
tion. As Lord Denning put it: the punishment inflicted for grave crimes
should adequately reflect the revulsion felt by the great majority of
citizens for them. It is a mistake to consider the objects of punish-
ment as being deterrent or reformative or preventive and nothing
else ... the ultimate justification of any punishment is not that it is a
3s Gerstein, supra note 1, at 253.
39 Bennett, supra note 5.
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deterrent but that it is the emphatic denunciation by the community
of a crime; and from this point of view there are some murders which,
in the present state of public opinion, demand the most emphatic
denunciation of all, namely the death penalty.
40
It is the author's contention that any one individual's conception
of the feeling of the general public pertaining to any social phenom-
enon is based primarily upon his own feelings on the subject. There-
fore, the author accords very little weight to this proposition put
forth by the abolitionists.
Sensationalism
The abolitionists staunchly maintain that "a trial where a life
may be at stake is highly sensationalized, adversely affects the ad-
ministration of justice, and is bad for the community."41 Deplorable
though this may be, it is undoubtedly true. But, are not hotly con-
tested divorce cases, trials involving morals charges and bastardly
proceedings also highly sensationalized and therefore just as deplor-
able? All of these cases occasion sensationalism on the part of the
free press and its more prurient customers; and theatrics in the
courtroom are not limited to cases involving capital crimes. There-
fore it could be logically said that it is the offense for which the
accused is being tried which causes the publicity and sensationalism,
not the punishment which he may face if convicted. Bearing this
in mind, it seems that this argument, although admittedly true, is due
very little consideration in an evaluation of the abolitionists' platform.
Cruelty
The abolitionists argue that capital punishment by any method
is "cruel both to the persons upon whom it is inflicted and to their
families."42 Although "it cannot be said to violate the constitutional
concept of cruelty," 43 it is definitely a harsh punishment. Since all
punishment is harsh, the real question is whether capital punishment
is any more harsh than its alternative, life imprisonment. This
question has been the subject of considerable debate and conjec-
ture, with no clearly defined conclusion found on either side by the
author.
It would seem that the most authoritative statements as to the
relative cruelty of the two punishmens would have to come from
those who have had to suffer under the impending reality of each.
40 Quoted in Gerstein, supra note 1, at 254.41 Bennett, supra note 5.42 Snyder, supra note 28, at 102.
4 3 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958).
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Leopold stated after thirty years of imprisonment that he still believed
that prompt death wolud have caused. him and his family less suf-
fering.44 Chessman said that, if the only alternative were life im-
prisonment, he would take the gas chamber.45 Both of these men had
reason to consider both punishments and their thoughts were sub-
stantially similar. It is not difficult to understand how, or why, a
man would prefer instant death to life imprisonment, which has been
defined as death by inches. This, admittedly, is not a sufficient basis
to conclude that the death penalty is less cruel than life imprison-
ment, but it would indicate that the difference in degree of cruelty,
if any, must be measured in light of the particular individual who
is facing the punishment. This is an area worthy of debate but
any conclusion drawn by one who has made it while seated securely
behind his desk, far removed from the nearest prison cell or electric
chair, would be deemed by the author to be due very little weight
in an argument either for or against capital punishment.
Religion
A few abolitionists contend that "capital punishment has no
place in our society simply because it is purely a matter of vengeance
not to be satisfied within our Judeo-Christian morality."46 It is the
author's contention that any arguments based upon religion could,
and usually do, continue ad infinitum with neither side gaining any
noticeable headway. For this reason this argument will not be
granted much space in this article. Of necessity, an argument in
this vein will include numerous quotes from scripture. Therefore, the
author feels justified in using two of his own; First, "he that striketh
a man with a will to kill him, shall be put to death,"47 and secondly,
"the ancients shall deliver him into the hand of the kinsman of him
whose blood was shed and he shall die. Thou shall not pity him."48
These abolitionists also argue that the state is "playing God" in
taking a life. Richard H. Rovere answered this argument as follows:
Man must play God, for he has certain God like powers, among them
a considerable degree of mastery over life and death, and he cannot
avoid their exercise. Science has put into our hands-and politics has
required us to grasp firmly-instruments which force a human judg-
ment on whether or not the entire race is to be executed; even in
benign employment, these instruments can affect the very image of man
44 Saturday Evening Post, April 23, 1955, p. 138.
45 Life, Feb. 22, 1960, p. 32.46 Hagarty, Capital Punishment Should Be Retained, 3 Can. B.J. 42, 47
(1960).47 Exodus 21:12 (King James).48 Deuteronomy 19:12-13 (King James).
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many millenia hence, and for that matter, the duration of all life. In a
less awesome-but an awesome enough-way, modem science has been
usurping prerogatives once held to be God's alone. It has learned to
cheat death not merely by the prolongation of life but by calling men
back to life after several hours on the other shore. The judge who orders
an execution is no more guilty of playing God than the doctor who,
having decided that a human being has been summoned to eternity
too soon, restores him to the world of time and suffering and sin.49
Any argument by the abolitionists based upon religion cannot
be given great weight because of the nebulous nature of the founda-
tion on which it rests.
Expediency
The next basic premise of the abolitionists is the proposition that
"when the death sentence is removed as a possible punishment, more
convictions are possible with fewer delays."60 This argument seems
to be based primarily upon expediency. While the means of achiev-
ing justice should be as simple, direct and unencumbered as possible,
should the end be sacrificed to expedite the means? This would seem
to be their basic contention, and, if so, it falls of its own weight.
Before they can make a sound argument in this vein, they must first
prove that the end (capital punishment) as such, is not such a
legally justifiable end as would offset the fact that convictions are
very difficult to obtain (and are almost always appealed) and are
often subject to many delays. This they have not shown.
Rehabilitation
The proponents of abolition argue that the theory of rehabilita-
tion is inconsistent with the death penalty.51 However, it should be
remembered that rehabilitation is only an enjoyable by-product, and
is by no means the sole goal of punishment.6 2 The fact that a life
sentence is the generally recognized alternative to the death penalty
is prima facie proof that protection and not rehabilitation is the
desired aim of punishment.
Admittedly, the theory of rehabilitation is and should be one of
society's major weapons in asserting its self-defense, but it would
be a "vain and dangerous boast to say that modem science can cure
anybody with understanding," including the most cold-blooded kill-
er.53 Safeguarding society should unquestionably "not assume so all-
important a role that we ride roughshod over the legitimate interests
49 R1overe, Review of Reflections on Hanging, The New Yorker, Sept. 14,
1957, p. 164.50 Bennett, supra note 5.
51 Snyder, supra note 28, at 110.52 Gerstein, supra note 1, at 255.
5 3 Hagarty, supra note 46, at 45.
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of the individual, his right to fair and decent treatment and to have
his life and liberty held inviolate against unjustified infringements by
the state."' But, "the public safety must take precedence" 5  There-
fore, in the few extreme cases where a death penalty is given, and a
conflict thereby arises with the theory of rehabilitation, sound reason-
ing dictates that in the interest of public safety the death penalty
must take precedence.
Legal Murder
Many abolitionists use the term "legal murder" as synonymous
with capital punishment in presenting their case. The author con-
tends that the use of this term because of its obvious implications,
presents an argument in itself. "Legal murder" paints a picture of
capital punishment in the mind of the laymen as being a brutal,
cold-blooded killing by the state of a helpless victim of the state's
wrath. This term is based solely on the emotional image it creates
in the listener, is completely unfounded in fact or in theory, and is
unworthy of employment by the conscientious proponent of abolition.
The fact that individuals have given up their right to private
vengeance and turned it over to the state, with the state having taken
over the right and duty to protect its members and to punish and
restrain offenders, has always been regarded as a fundamental step
in the formation of a society.56 A state's right and duty of protecting
its members is generally recognized as being one of its most important
functions. This function of the state has been likened to an indi-
vidual's right to self-defense. 57 Just as an individual has the right to
protect himself from an aggressor, the state has the right, and also
the duty, to protect its members from the danger presented by a
corrupt member of the social body. "The slaying of an evil-doer is
lawful," says St. Thomas Aquinas, "inasmuch as it is directed to the
welfare of the whole community."58
The state's right and duty to execute a member of its society
has been said to be similar to that of a doctor who has the right
and duty to amputate the gangrenous foot of a diabetic for the sake
of the health of the entire body.59 "Execution is a social remedy for
a social disease."60
54 Cuttmacher & Weihofen, Psychiatry and the Law 447 (1952).
S5 East, Society and the Criminal 268 (1951).5 6 Cuttmacher, The Psychiatric Approach to Crime and Correction, 23
Law & Contemp. Prob. 632, 639-40 (1958).5 7 Snyder, supra note 28, at 108.58 Gerstein, supra note 1, at 255.
59 Hagarty, supra note 46, at 44.60 Ji .
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It is clear that capital punishment is not "legal murder" and the
use of the term is unfortunate because of the cloud it casts upon
otherwise laudable arguments set forth by the proponents of abo-
lition.
CONCLUSION
The proponents of the abolition of capital punishment have the
burden of proving that such a change in judicial theory is warranted,
and also that the recommended change will inure to the benefit of
society as a whole. The foregoing thirteen arguments represent the
basis of the abolitionists' case. Have the proponents of the abolition
of capital punishmetn sustained their burden of proof? In presenting
a concise rebuttal of each of the traditional arguments espoused by
abolitionists and showing that this burden of proof has not been met,
it is clear that the author's position is that capital punishment
should be retained. However, the writer's primary intention in writing
this article was to present the abolitionists' case in such a way as to
inspire the reader to carefully evaluate the merits of the contentions
set forth by the proponents of abolition, and make his own conclu-
sion as to whether the burden of proof has been sustained.
. Rees Kinney
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